Dependable Hybrid Systems Design: a Refinement Approach

Zheng Cheng Dominique Méry


Nov, 2020

Where were we?

- Overview of hybrid system
- Review of calculus
- Review of Event-B
- Develop theories in Event-B

Outlines


Smart Heating System



- 2 modes: ON/OFF
- Simple dynamics: $\dot{T}=1/-1$
- \blacktriangleright Sample at δ s
- Switch mode costs t_{act} s
 (t_{act} < δ)
- Safety: $T_{min} \leq T \leq T_{max}$

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
Refinement Strategy for Hybrid System Design



Lab Material

- https://github.com/veriatl/LORIA_WEEK2
- Import theory-axiom-real to Rodin, and deploy this theory
- Import ex-heating-maintainer-event to Rodin


Smart Heating System (Specification M0)



Smart Heating System (Specification M0)

- Generic hybrid system state trajectory
- Generic safety property
- Big-step semantics


Smart Heating System (Safety M1)



Smart Heating System (Safety M1)

- Concrete system state trajectory
- Concrete safety property
- Big-step semantics refined

Smart Heating System (Cycle M2)



Smart Heating System (Cycle M2)

Checklist:

- Time pointer
- Refined system state trajectory

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
- Refined safety property
- Small-step semantics

Practice

In M2_cycle,

- 1. Encode invariant *safety*: up until *now*, the room temperature is within safe range.
- 2. Once task 1 is finished, a proof obligation named *Prophecy/safety/INV* will be generated automatically, try to prove this result.

Smart Heating System (Close-loop M3)



Smart Heating System (Close-loop M3)

- Variable for close-loop mode control
- Prediction (Controller)
- Progression (Plant)


Smart Heating System (Control Logic M4) Event-triggered

- Event-triggered design(when certain events are detected what actions that system should take)
- Specification of time-triggered design

Smart Heating System (Control Logic M4)


Time-triggered

- Revisit the description of heating system
- Time-triggered design(the controller takes action only every once in a while)



- 2 modes: ON/OFF
- $\rightarrow\,$ the only actuation we can do


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
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- Simple dynamics: $\dot{T}=1/-1$
- \rightarrow monotonicity




- 2 modes: ON/OFF
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 - Simple dynamics: $\dot{T}=1/-1$
- \rightarrow monotonicity
 - Sample at δ s
- $\rightarrow\,$ Decision at sampling time

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


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 - Switch mode costs t_{act} s
 (t_{act} < δ)
- ightarrow Cost of switch mode




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 - Safety: $T_{min} \leq T \leq T_{max}$


Case 1: ON mode, $T(now) \leq T_{max}$, Stay ON



Case 1: ON mode, $T(now + \delta) \leq T_{max}$, Stay ON



Case 1: ON mode, $T(now + \delta + t_{act}) \leq T_{max}$, Stay ON




Practice

In *M*4_2_*control_logic_time_trigger*, *Ctrl_ON_safe* corresponds to case 1.

- 1. Explain *Ctrl_ON_safe* using natural language.
- 2. If you think that this control logic is sound, try to prove the proof obligation *Ctrl_ON_safe/grd4/THM*.
- Otherwise, please modify Ctrl_ON_safe to match your expectation, and try to convince Rodin your proposal is sound.

Case 2: ON mode, $T(now + \delta + t_{act}) > T_{max}$, TO OFF



Practice

In *M*4_2_*control_logic_time_trigger*, *Ctrl_ON_unsafe* corresponds to case 2.

- 1. Draw the trajectory when mode switching
- 2. Give a mathematical expression for such trajectory
- Referencing Ctrl_ON_safe, complete the encoding of Ctrl_ON_unsafe, and convince Rodin that the control logic in this case is sound(hint: prove Ctrl_ON_unsafe/grd4/THM).

Code Generation

```
1: if q = ON \lor q = OFFON then
2:
        if T_{on}(now + \delta + t_{act}) \leq T_{max} then
3:
           q \leftarrow ON
4:
      else
5:
           q \leftarrow ONOFF
6:
      end if
7: else if q = OFF \lor q = ONOFF then
8:
        if T_{off}(now + \delta + t_{act}) \geq T_{min} then
9:
           m \leftarrow OFF
10:
      else
11:
       m \leftarrow OFFON
12:
        end if
13: end if
```

Problems

1. Initial condition shifting might make the algorithm unnecessary complex

```
1: if q = ON \lor q = OFFON then
 2:
        if T_{on}(now + \delta + t_{act}) \leq T_{max} then
 3:
            \mathsf{q} \leftarrow \mathsf{ON}
 4:
      else
 5:
            q \leftarrow ONOFF \dots
 6:
        end if
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        if T_{off}(now + \delta + t_{act}) \geq T_{min} then
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            m \leftarrow OFF
10:
         else
11:
             m \leftarrow OFFON \dots
12:
         end if
13: end if
```

Problems

- 1. Initial condition shifting might make the algorithm unnecessary complex
- 2. Solution of differential equations might be non-unique(e.g. bessal function), or non-exists(e.g. most of real-life systems).


```
1: if q = ON \lor q = OFFON then
2:
        if T_{on}(now + \delta + t_{act}) < T_{max} then
3:
           q \leftarrow ON
4:
        else
5:
           q \leftarrow ONOFF
6:
        end if
7: else if q = OFF \lor q = ONOFF then
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        if T_{off}(now + \delta + t_{act}) \geq T_{min} then
9:
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```

Challenge

Can we express control logic in terms of sensor reading plus evaluable terms?


1: if $q = ON \lor q = OFFON$ then 2: if $f_1(T(now), constants)$ then 3: $\mathsf{q} \leftarrow \mathsf{ON}$ 4: else 5: $q \leftarrow ONOFF$ 6: end if 7: else if $q = OFF \lor q = ONOFF$ then 8: if $f_2(T(now), constants)$ then 9: $m \leftarrow OFF$ 10: else 11: $m \leftarrow OFFON$ 12: end if 13: end if

Proposal: Numerical Solutions + Coping with Errors



Forward-Euler Method and Truncation Errors


Forward-Euler: $f_e(n+\delta)=f_e(n)+\dot{f}(n, f_n)^*\delta$



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Forward-Euler Method and Truncation Errors







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Forward-Euler Method and Truncation Errors





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Properties of Forward-Euler Method and Truncation Errors

- ► Global truncation errors: $| f(\delta) - f_e(\delta) | \le \epsilon_{gte} = \frac{\delta M}{2K} (e^{K(t-t_0)} - 1)$
- Local truncation errors:


 $| f(\delta + \triangle) - f_e(\delta + \triangle) | \le \epsilon_{lte} = M$

 Derivation of these properties can be found at this tutorial: [ref]

New Properties of Heating System

- ► $(\text{prop}_{on}^{lte}) | T_{on}(now + \delta + t_{act}) Te_{on}(now + \delta + t_{act}) | \le \epsilon_{on}^{lte}$
- ► $(\text{prop}_{off}^{lte}) |T_{off}(now + \delta + t_{act}) Te_{off}(now + \delta + t_{act})| \le \epsilon_{off}^{lte}$
- $(prop_{T_{on}})$ $T_{on}(now, T_{on}(now)) = 1$
- $(prop_{T_{off}})$ $T_{off}(now, T_{off}(now)) = -1$

Case 1: ON mode safe



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Case 1: ON mode safe

$$T_{on}(now + \delta + t_{act}) \leq Te_{on}(now + \delta + t_{act}) + \epsilon_{on}^{lte}$$

= $T_{on}(now) + \dot{T}_{on}(now, T_{on}(now)) \cdot (\delta + t_{act}) + \epsilon_{on}^{lte}$
= $T_{on}(now) + (\delta + t_{act}) + \epsilon_{on}^{lte}$
 $\leq T_{max}$

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Case 2: ON mode unsafe

$T_{on}(now + \triangle) = \dots$ > T_{max}

Practice

In M_5_euler ,

- 1. Encode control logic of case 1 in terms of Euler approximation in the *grd*4 of event *Ctrl_ON_safe*.
- Using the derivation on page.36, prove Ctrl_ON_safe/thm01/THM - Ctrl_ON_safe/thm04/THM.
- 3. Finsh the derivation on page.37, encode this control logic of case 2 in terms of Euler approximation in the *grd*4 of event *Ctrl_ON_unsafe*.
- 4. Prove Ctrl_ON_unsafe/thm01/THM -Ctrl_ON_unsafe/thm04/THM.

Simulation: Automata from Event-B

Event $Prediction_1 \cong$ Any reading Where ... $grd_i: q = ON$ $grd_j:$ $T_{on}(now) + \delta + t_{act} + \epsilon_{on}^{he} \le T_{max}$ Then ... $act_i: q = ON$ $act_j: fa = T_{on}$ End

 $T_{on}(now) + \delta + t_{act} + \epsilon_{on}^{he} \leq T_{max}$ ON $T = T_{on}$

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
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Practice

In M_5_euler,

1. Examine all the control logic events, draw the automata for the heating system.

Simulation




Simulation in Stateflow

- Demo
- More reference:
 - Download matlab for UL students: [link]
 - Getting started with Stateflow: [link]
 - Temporal logic operators in Stateflow: [link]

Conclusion

A refinement strategy for design dependable hybrid system



Conclusion

- A refinement strategy for design dependable hybrid system
- Propose different refinement strategies to design control logic
 - Based on modelling numerical solutions, and coping with truncation errors
 - Adaptable to deal with sensor errors or round-off errors